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Abstract 
This study investigates whether ownership type does matter for bank performance in 
an emerging market. By tracing the identity of top owners, I group large shareholder 
of China’s commercial banks into government, state owned enterprises (SOEs), 
domestic private investors and foreign investors. These distinct types of shareholders 
have multiple motivations and incentives, in turn, this will affect how they perform 
their control rights and monitor over the invested banks. The main findings regarding 
the impact of ownership structure on bank performance suggest that banks with high 
state shareholding tend to have poorer performance and low profitability, consistent 
with much of the literature. In addition, banks with higher domestic privately 
shareholders are generally operated more profitably. Furthermore, higher foreign 
ownership may negatively affect bank performance. Moreover, ownership type 
diversity is positively associated with bank performance, and banks with concentrated 
ownership are worse performing. My findings are robustness under the different 
measures of bank performance. 
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1 Introduction 
Explaining performance differences among banks is a prevailing theoretical and 
empirical issue in the field of finance literatures. Ownership structure is widely 
accepted in the finance and economics study as an instrumental determinant of bank 
performance. Indeed, a considerable literature has developed on the relationship 
between ownership and performance. More specifically, examining the state 
ownership versus private ownership has received much attention in banking sector.  
 
This study falls within a broad research program focusing on ownership in general. 
There are commonly three types of shareholder – state, private investors, and foreign 
investor in governance literature. There have been a number of empirical studies 
showing how differences between owner types influence bank performance (for 
government owned banks, see Iannotta et al., 2013 and Berger et al., 2015; for 
ownership by privately owners, see Cornett et al., 2010; for ownership by foreign 
owners, see Lensink et al., 2008; for managerial owners, see DeYoung et al., 2013;). 
The results of these studies are mixed but overall suggest that types of owner differ in 
their contributions to performance variation over time. The aim of this study is to 
reconcile these conflicting results by enriching the analysis of the bank's ownership 
structure using the Chinese case. 
 
I limit this study to the significance of owner type in countries making the transition 
to some form of capitalism and focus specifically on China. China’s bank reform is 
still ongoing so that it is hard to reach conclusions on how it may affect the whole 
financial system. In particular, China’s banking sector is the most important 
component of the financial system (with 69% of total financial assets in 2016) and yet 
it has long remained undercapitalized and presented with non-performing loans. In 
addition, bank capitalization, solvency and profitability are still below the average of 
international counterparties. As China's growing importance in the world economy, 
improved understanding about the banking sector in China has enormous practical 
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implications for regulators and other stakeholders. Moreover, study on ownership 
differences has to be grounded in an environment whereby banks of different 
ownership types coexist and compete, China's transition economy presents such an 
ideal context.  
 
While ownership itself is an objective structure, I contend different ownership types 
that leads to different managerial cognitions. The main findings regarding the static 
effects of bank ownership on performance suggest that banks with more state 
shareholder tend to have poorer performance, consistent with much of the literature. 
In addition, banks with higher domestic privately shareholders are generally operated 
more profitably. Furthermore, higher foreign ownership may negatively affect bank 
performance. Moreover, ownership type diversity is positively associated with bank 
performance, while banks with concentrated ownership are worse performing. The 
results are robustness under the different measures of bank performance. My findings 
have implications for the design of appropriate corporate governance systems for 
Chinese commercial banks. Moreover, my results provide information that can inform 
policy debates within the China regulators.  
 
This study makes a number of contributions to the literature. Firstly, it analysis the 
effects of ownership reforms, enriching the literature from the perspective of 
transitional as well as developing countries. The type of privatization and the form of 
state ownership is one of the major concerns in these countries. Secondly, this study 
exploits how banks function in an economy that combines rapid economic growth and 
state-owned banks that serve pollical goals. In another word, it examines the role of 
corporate governance in the banking sector of emerging market using a unique sample 
of Chinese banks. Thirdly, it expands beyond the narrow confines of ownership 
concentration and performance by incorporating issues related to bank reform. Thus, 
it adds to the literature that aims to examine the determinants of the bank profitability. 
Besides, this is the first study that considers both concentration and diversity of 
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ownership structure (i.e. ownership distribution and nature of the owners) in banking 
sector. As the recent calls to consider multiple dimensions of diversity simultaneously, 
this study extend the literature on the effects of shareholder diversity on performance 
in banks. 
 
The study is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief outline of the current 
Chinese banking system, and followed by literature review in Section 3. Section 4 
discusses the methodology and the data used. Section 5 presents the results of the tests, 
and followed by the robustness test in Section 6. Section 7 summarises and presents 
the implications of the results for China’s banking sector in its new regulatory 
environment. 
 
 
2 China banking background 
For three decades prior to the 1970s, China was a centrally planned economy with the 
majority of companies owned by government or state-related cooperative entities. In 
another word, a large number of commercial banks are owned or controlled by the 
state, either directly through central or local government institutions or indirectly 
through marketized SOEs. Under the traditional communist system, the Chinese 
government gathered revenues from SOEs and provided financing support to the 
corporations according to the government planning. Whilst financial liberalisation 
helped to integrate Chinese markets with global markets, it constituted a major 
challenge for domestic banks and their systems of governance. However, the weak 
state of law and regulation in China’s capital market is a major limitation on the 
efficiency of financial institutions.  
 
The state-owned banks have been criticized for the larger amount of impairment loans 
due to the politically lending practices. Specifically, inefficient state-owned 
corporations are normally the largest borrowers for Chinese banks. Therefore, 
5 
 
Chinese government established the asset management companies that liquidated 
majority bank assets at high discounts. 
 
Prior to 2003, the majority of Chinese commercial bank had been controlled by 
government entities with minority individual shareholders. Banking sector has been 
the primary source of financing for the economy growth, with the banking and other 
financial institutions accounting for over 80% of whole country’s financial assets. 
China becomes the world’s rapidly developing economies in last two decades. 
 
In 2003, the government has been implementing a series of reforms to improve the 
efficiency and profitability of the state banks, particularly given the impending 
opening of the domestic financial sector to foreign investor under the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). China started the transition with a small number of large fully 
government-owned banks and few if any private banks. Three of the Big 4 state banks 
was changed from fully state owned banks to the corporations owned by public and 
private shareholders, despite the state still remains the largest shareholder. Foreign 
investors have been allowed to take few ownership shareholding in the state banks. 
Some larger banks were gone public in Hong Kong capital market, such as China 
Construction Bank listed in Hong Kong in 2005, and Bank of China and Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China cross listed in Hong Kong and Shanghai in 2006. 
 
In spite of these efforts, many inherent drawbacks still remain in Chinese banking 
system. For instance, the ownership of foreign owners is relatively minority, and their 
involvement in efficient corporate governance is remain limit. Besides, Chinese banks 
are forced to meet multiple and contradictory goals of supporting local economic 
growth, employment and political lending. 
 
 
3 Literature review and Hypothesis development 
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2.1 Ownership and performance  
Academic interests in bank performance have transfer from developed economies to 
developing and transitional markets. Bank governance structure is a critical and 
well-explored topic of relevant studies. For instance, the study on bank governance is 
dominated by research focus on how insiders versus outsiders can affect a bank’s 
performance. However, in addition to insider versus outsider equity holders, another 
important dimension of ownership structure is state or public ownership versus 
private ownership structure. Especially, the study examines the impact of equity 
ownership by different shareholders group on manager behavior, in turn affecting 
performance. Thus, it seems reasonable to suggest ownership is a key determinant 
underlying different corporate governance regimes.  
 
A bank’s ownership structure influences its performance for several reasons. Firstly, 
differences in ownership type identity, concentration, diversity, and resource 
endowments among shareholders determine their incentives and ability to monitor 
bank managers. Shareholdings by state, state owned enterprise (SOE), domestic 
private and foreign investors are typical examples of this phenomenon. Secondly, as 
shareholders have divergent interest, consequence they have different impacts on bank 
behavior.  
 
The relationship between the shareholder and management is complicated due to their 
interests are not aligned. The effect that ownership structure has on bank performance 
may be considered through the principal–agent framework (Altunbas et al., 2001).  
 
The effectiveness of governance is determined by ownership mechanisms and as 
consequence it affects firm performance. Several studies analyze whether ownership 
and governance do matter for bank performance. 
 
2.2 State 
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State ownership refers to equity investments by central or local governmental 
institutions. The state has become increasingly important as an owner of domestic 
firms as well as foreign firms (Carney and Child, 2013). Generally, governments 
owned banks have multiple (often conflicting) goals other than commercial 
considerations. They are forced to meet contradictory objectives of supporting 
employment and changing themselves into modern commercial banks. Therefore, 
state owned banks may not be the independent organization governed by shareholders 
with return maximization. Barth et al. (2013) presents a cross-country statistics on the 
degree of state ownership of the banking sector, they do not provide detailed 
information on the ownership structure of banks. 
 
Banks with majority government ownership are normally beneficial of either implicit 
or explicit regulatory support from the authority (Faccio et al., 2006). For instance, 
these banks are likely to benefit from a lower cost of funding when issuing debt or 
equity securities in capital markets. Cornett et al. (2010) find that the deterioration in 
the cash flow returns, core capital, and credit quality of state-owned banks was 
significantly greater than that of private banks, especially for the countries that were 
hardest hit by the Asian crisis. Chen et al. (2016) find that government banks have 
high loan growth rates than privately-owned banks. Zhu and Yang (2016) find that 
state-owned banks have relatively lower risk taking after foreign acquisition. Zhang et 
al. (2013) suggest that banks taking a lower level of risks perform better. Tan (2016) 
find that compared to the state-owned commercial banks, the joint-stock commercial 
banks and city commercial banks in China have lower profitability. Beuselinck et al. 
(2017) suggest that the benefits of government ownership increased relative to the 
costs of government ownership in countries with good investor protection and low 
corruption. 
 
On the other hand, the bulk of the evidence on government ownership of banks 
suggests that it is associated with poor bank performance due to weak managerial 
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incentives, political lending and misallocation of resource (Berger et al., 2005, Micco 
et al., 2007 and Lin and Zhang, 2009). Firstly, state shareholding is argued to be 
intrinsic inefficient because agency problem (Williams and Nguyen, 2005). The 
agent-principal problem turn into more significant under government ownership. 
Managers are likely to pursue their own benefits rather than acting in the best interest 
of owners, which may lead to negative effects on bank performance. Ashrf (2017) 
suggest that government ownership in banks are likely generating the moral hazard 
problems due to the expectation of government bailouts in worst economic conditions. 
Therefore, governance of banks more relevant for performance in bad than in good 
times (Martin-Oliver et al., 2017). 
 
Second, state invest in a particular bank because of its political and strategic value 
(Iannotta et al., 2013). As such, governments tend to own equity in firms and 
industries that usually are not the most competitive ones. Iannotta et al. (2013) find 
that government-owned banks have higher operating risk than private banks, 
indicating the presence of governmental protection that induces higher risk taking. For 
instance, state owned banks are likely granting loans to socially valuable investment 
projects with low financial returns. State ownership of banks have led to ownership 
bias in lending (Lin et al., 2015). As consequence, these lending behaviors would 
inevitably deteriorate their asset quality and increase their risk profile. Dong et al. 
(2014) also find that government controlled banks tend to take more risks than those 
controlled by state-owned enterprises or private investors. Allen et al. (2017) find that 
government-owned banks relatively increased credit supply during the global crisis. 
Iannotta et al. (2007) find that government-owned banks exhibit a lower profitability 
than privately owned banks. Indeed, stated owned banks with lower profitability may 
be related to the situation that those banks finance projects with high social benefit.  
 
Furthermore, state owned banks exist a lack of market discipline in inefficient and 
inadequate indicates of punishing managers for misbehaviors (Zhang et al., 2016). 
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Bailey et al. (2011) find that poor financial performance and high managerial 
expenses increase the likelihood of obtaining a bank loan in China. Besides, the 
government’s nominees on the board are typically bureaucrats with minimal skill or 
expertise in banking sector. Micco et al. (2007) find that state-owned banks located in 
developing countries tend to have lower profitability and higher costs than their 
private counterparts. Shaban and James (2017) find that state-owned banks tend to be 
less profitable and more exposed to risk than private and foreign banks. 
 
H1: Banks with high state ownership are negatively related to performance. 
 
2.3 State owned enterprise (SOE) 
Although an SOE’s ultimate controlling shareholder is the local or central government, 
but as the shareholder of a bank, SOE are different from government shareholders in 
many prospective. First, despite SOEs need to serve some politicians’ interests, but 
they are more empowered and have large autonomy. Second, SOEs have some 
financial policy constraints and may not obtain sufficient support from government. 
Furthermore, banks give preferential treatment to SOEs and discriminate against 
non-SOEs in China when making lending decision (Lu et al., 2013). Therefore, SOEs 
are willing to hold higher ownership and maintain good relationship with bank. Chen 
et al. (2009) find that SOE controlled Chinese listed firms perform better than private 
controlled firms. SOEs’ may change their organizational goals following partial 
privatization, in turn, its effect on firm performance, as higher levels of profit 
orientation are instituted by the private investors. 
 
In theory, SOEs are owned by all citizens in a country. However, they are controlled 
and managed by government bureaucrats and politicians in practice. SOEs are able to 
obtain additional finances from government if they make losses and get rescued with 
public money if they are threatened with bankruptcy. In this way, the managerial view 
of SOEs posits that these banks are inefficient because their managers are not 
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adequately monitored (leading to poor incentive structures). The predominant view is 
that SOEs may not have enough resources and financial expertise to monitor and 
discipline bank managers, and thereby reducing agency problems. Therefore, 
managers of those banks have little incentive to minimize costs or maximize profit. 
Bank owned by SOE are not run by their owners, therefore the owners cannot tell how 
much of performance is due to managerial failure or external factors. Furthermore, 
organizational slack can readily inform the understanding of organizations’ behavior 
is possible due to SOEs prioritize goals such as social welfare different than other 
private owned firms (Stan et al., 2014). Saghi-Zedek (2016) find that when banks 
have no controlling shareholder yields diseconomies on activity diversification.  
 
Given that they are less sensitive to market pressures, economic performance and 
operation efficiency are not necessarily the priority concerns of SOE managers. In 
particular, direct monitoring from shareholders are either unavailable or are 
ineffective tools for mitigating agency costs in SOE. Thus, in the absence of 
appropriate monitoring, bank managers may prefer to take riskier activities in order to 
maintain or increase their remuneration.  
 
H2: Banks with high SOE ownership are negatively related to performance. 
 
2.4 Domestic private investors  
The third type of shareholder is the domestic private shareholder. In many emerging 
countries, domestic private investors are among the largest group of blockholders 
(Claessens et al., 2000). Lu et al. (2009) show that Chinese domestic investors have a 
greater propensity to hold significant ownership in commercial banks due to less 
suffer bank discrimination for political reasons. These shareholders usually have a 
long investment horizon. Shaban and James (2017) find that domestic investors tend 
to select the best performers for acquisition.  
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Domestic private ownership is anticipated to reduce agency problems and enhance 
operating performance through varies mechanisms, such as managerial ownership and 
attractive remuneration package. These investors tend to have maximal equity returns 
as their primary investment objective. Thus, they are typically tied to the firm only 
with their equity stakes and mostly operate at arm’s length from managers. In 
response to the greater competitive and liberalized environment, these investors are 
closely monitor and give pressure on managers to improve operations as inadequate 
managers can be changed. Their monitoring incentives as well as their abilities are 
substantially greater than other domestic institutions. Jiang et al. (2013) show that the 
privatization of banks has improved performance with respect to revenue inflow and 
efficiency gains in the short- or long-run in China. Saghi-Zedek (2016) also find that 
bank with more domestic shareholders display higher profitability as these 
shareholders bring additional skills to manage activity diversification and yields 
economies.  
 
H3: Banks with high domestic private ownership are positively related to 
performance. 
 
2.5 Foreign shareholders 
Financial globalization has further opened in banking sector that were previously 
off-limits to international investment. Increased openness to foreign equity investors 
generally enhances the information environment such as increasing analyst coverage 
and decreasing earnings management.  
 
Foreign shareholding is expected to have a positively impact on performance. Firstly, 
foreign shareholders are less prone to political pressure and more likely to participate 
in arm's-length negotiation and monitoring in companies (Huang and Zhu, 2015). 
Second, foreign shareholders are likely bringing in new technology, modern 
techniques and effective managerial skills. As foreign investors often invest similar 
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corporations in different jurisdictions, they tend to have the relevant experience and 
know-how to set appropriate benchmarks for performance. Gillan and Starks (2003) 
observe that foreign owners play a more active role than local investors in advocating 
better firm-level governance which may influence corporate performance. Empirical 
studies (i.e. Berger et al., 2009; Lin and Zhang, 2009) suggest the improvements in 
performance after involved with foreign strategic investorss in domestic banks. 
Besides, foreign investors may choose to invest the better performing banks, or 
alternatively that the government sells the equity of better performing banks first in an 
effort to attract foreign investors. These foreign investors might help local banks in 
employ advanced banking strategies to enhance operating efficiency. Furthermore, 
foreign shareholders may insist having board member to represent their interest. 
Having foreign directors on the board would bring diversity of expertise that may 
effective than similar members from local business environment, as a result to 
enhance bank performance.  
 
However, there are some inherent limitation for foreign shareholders to improve bank 
performance. Firstly, foreign investors may difficult to closely monitor from a long 
distance and limited access to local information. Indeed, those shareholders have 
general disadvantage about understanding the local country’s economy, language, 
laws and politics. Second, foreigners and nationals may receive different treatment 
from local governments, consumers and suppliers. Lensink et al. (2008) find that 
foreign ownership negatively affects bank efficiency. Besides, Berger et al. (2009b) 
claim that foreign ownership is not helpful for bank stability in 23 developed nations. 
Lee and Hsieh (2014) show that domestic banks are better than foreign banks. 
 
H4: Banks with higher foreign ownership are positively related to performance. 
 
2.4 Ownership diversity 
Ownership diversity is the distribution of equity type with regard to votes and capital 
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which includes the state, SOE, domestic private, and foreign owners. Ownership 
diversity can influence firm performance in several ways. First, these diversities have 
impact corporate governance structure because they determine the incentives of 
managers and the economic efficiency of the corporations. Second, enhance 
performance is a common avenue of the state, private, and foreign investors, conflicts 
of interest between each shareholder are alleviated. More diversity equity ownership 
may increase corporate performance because it means better alignment of the 
monetary incentives between the manager and other equity owners. Theories from 
economics, organizational behaviour, and social psychology can provide some 
understanding of the nature of the link between ownership diversity and financial 
performance. Diversity incentives of shareholders holds their potential conflict to 
improve the information provided by the board to managers. Thus, differences in 
background of shareholders are very likely to produce unique information sets that are 
available to management for better decision-making. However, decision-making may 
be slower and more conflicted with diverse shareholders. Garcia-Meca et al. (2015) 
shows that directors diversity increases bank performance.  
 
Therefore, relying on above arguments, it is reasonably to believe that a bank with 
different type of owners (state, SOE, domestic private, and foreign) is more capable of 
securing the complementary set of key resources for improve the operations. 
 
H5: Ownership type diversity is positively related to bank performance. 
 
2.5 Ownership concentration 
Ownership concentration is a generally used structure through which investors aim to 
ensure the reasonable return on their investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Claessens et al. (2000) find that more than two-thirds of the firms are controlled by a 
single shareholder after examine the separation of ownership and control in publicly 
corporations in East Asian countries. In particular, Caprio et al. (2007) find that banks 
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are not widely held and tend to be controlled by a family or the State. It is commonly 
held that concentrated ownership offers the best protection to shareholders. 
 
Evidences from previous studies on the effect of ownership concentration on bank 
performances are mixed and complexity. The different national system of corporate 
governance reflected differences in ownership structure of firms in distinct economies 
and particularly, as well as in ownership concentration (Shleifer and Vishney. 1997; 
Caprio et al., 2007). Beltratti and Stulz (2012) find that more concentrated banking 
system was not associated with better performance.  
 
It is not necessarily the case that greater ownership concentration means better 
alignment of interests of management with shareholders and thus enhance 
performance. DeYoung et al. (2001) indicate that banks with large ownership 
concentration face a classic monitoring problem. Garcia-Herrero et al. (2008) find that 
a more concentrated banking system is associated with a lower profit. Indeed, 
controlling shareholders could use control of a bank to benefit their related entities 
and easily extract private benefits. Besides, those controlling shareholder may abuse 
using their power, which could be detrimental to the value maximization goal of the 
firm. Large bank shareholders can fire managers, such shareholders can use their 
power to ensure that managers engage in related lending (Caprio et al., 2007). 
Battaglia and Gallo (2017) find that greater shareholder influences are take more 
systemic risk during the crisis. Indeed, although few larger shareholders might have 
the power to induce management to run the firm in their interest, these interests need 
not converge with those of minority shareholders.  
 
In contrast, some empirical evidence shows that banks with higher ownership by few 
shareholders performed better because large ownership concentration has more 
incentive to enhance firm performance and to discipline managers. Heugens et al. 
(2009) find a significant positive association concentrated ownership and firm 
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financial performance in Asia. Iannotta et al. (2007) find that ownership concentration 
has no effects on banks’ performance, but is associated with better loan quality. 
Caprio et al. (2007) find that concentrated ownership reduces incentives for insiders 
to expropriate bank resources, and that this boosts valuations. In the opposite situation, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that as more dispersed shareholding, the firm value 
increase.  
 
More concentrated ownership can exploit strong bargaining power with mangers, in 
turn reducing managerial initiatives. Thus, my sixth hypothesis is as follows: 
H6: Ownership concentration is negatively related to bank performance.  
 
 
4 Methodology and data  
4.1 Data and sample selection 
Our sample is an unbalanced panel of 132 Chinese banks during the period of 2005–
2015. These banks are the top banks based on the total assets according to the annual 
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) ranking. 
 
To investigate the impact of ownership structure on banks' performance, I collect my 
dataset from two sources. I hand-collect the information about the sample banks' 
ownership structures, such as the percentage of ownership held by the top ten owners 
from annual reports. In addition, the bank-specific accounting data are retrieved from 
the BankScope database and the banks' annual reports. Whenever Bankscope and 
annual report do not support enough information or has questionable amount, I 
retrieve or double-check the data from other official sources, such as annual issues of 
Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking.  
 
Table (1) shows the top ten largest shareholders ownership structures of the banks in 
my sample over the period 2005 to 2015. 
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Table 1: The ownership structure of Chinese banks 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Largest shareholder 830 21.82 15.64 4.23 92.01 
Second shareholder 830 12.25 6.49 1.83 50.00 
Third shareholder 830 7.87 3.53 0.90 20.00 
Fourth shareholder 830 6.07 3.02 0.07 20.00 
Fifth shareholder 830 4.92 2.36 0.06 11.67 
Sixth shareholder 830 4.17 2.22 0.06 10.08 
Seventh shareholder 830 3.61 1.94 0.04 10.00 
Eighth shareholder 830 3.06 1.69 0.04 9.90 
Ninth shareholder 830 2.66 1.51 0.03 8.00 
Tenth shareholder 830 2.33 1.35 0.01 8.00 
Ownership of top ten 
shareholders 
830 
67.18 18.23 38.54 100 
      
Note: This table presents the percentage of a bank's equity share capital owned by the top ten largest shareholders individually and their 
total shareholding. 
 
I delete the observations in the top 0.5% and in the bottom 0.5% of bank performance 
and ownership structure, as Chen et al. (2014) did. 
 
 
4.2 Model 
Several studies analyze whether ownership and governance do matter for bank 
performance. For example, Lin and Zhang (2009) assess the effect of bank ownership 
on performance using a panel of Chinese banks over the 1997–2004 period. Berger et 
al. (2009) analyze the efficiency using 266 annual observations over 1994–2003 on 38 
commercial banks in China with different majority ownership. Iannotta et al. (2007) 
investigates whether any significant difference exists in the performance of European 
banks with different ownership structure. 
 
Following previous studies (Jiang et al., 2013; Lin and Zhang, 2009; Iannotta et al., 
2007; De Andres and Vallelado, 2008), I focus on two traditional performance 
measures. First, we use the measures of bank profitability, return on assets (ROA). 
ROA is calculated as the income before extraordinary items, interest expense, and 
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taxes, divided by the average of the two most recent years of total assets. Follow 
Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) and Berger et al. (2005), the second performance variable 
is return on equity (ROE), defined as profits (net income after taxes) relative to equity, 
which is used as robustness test.  
 
In line with prior studies that examine the relationship between ownership and bank 
performance (e.g., Lin and Zhang, 2009; Berger et al., 2009; Iannotta et al., 2009), I 
use the following regression specification: 
 
𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛴𝑘𝛿𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(Equation 1) 
 
where the dependent variable PERF is one of the two bank performance measures: the 
return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). 
 
STATE, SOE, DPO and FOR indicates the percentage of equity shares held by the 
shareholders for government, state owned enterprise, domestic private owners and 
foreign investors respectively. State ownership refers to equity investments by central 
or local governmental institutions. In China, for historical reasons, a large number of 
commercial banks are owned or controlled by the state, either directly through central 
or local government institutions or indirectly through marketized SOEs. Governments 
have conflicting objectives other than profit maximization. The model captures the 
contribution of state ownership, SOE ownership, domestic private ownership, foreign 
ownership, ownership diversity and ownership concentration on the performance 
measured by return on asset and return on equity of conglomerate banks. 
 
DIV and CONC represent the ownership type diversity and concentration. First, 
following Chen et al. (2014), I used the Herfindahl measure, a commonly-used 
approach of computing the level of diversification for ownership type diversity.  
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𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦
= 1
∑ 𝑖 [(
𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑖 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑏𝑦 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 )
2
]⁄
  
(Equation 2) 
where i can be one of the state, SOE, domestic private, or foreign investors. 
 
In addition, ownership concentration equals the sum of the squared ownership shares 
of the ten largest shareholders of the bank (Dong et al., 2014). It is the proportion of 
shares owned by a certain number of shareholders. I argued that the higher the 
number of equity owned by the block holders, the more mangers action will be 
monitored to act in the interest of the shareholders. 
 
A larger value of ownership diversity indicates a more diverse presence of ownership 
types among those larger shareholders, while a higher value of ownership 
concentration indicates more concentrated control by larger shareholders. 
 
Control variables  
Bank size: Bank size is measured by the natural logarithm of the bank's total assets. 
This variable includes the total assets to take account for differences in bank size. 
Large banks normally have diversified geographically, setting up branches around the 
world in countries and with many different sources of income. As large and complex 
organisations that have multiple and overlapping layers of hierarchy, they may suffer 
from complex agency problems. However, DeYoung et al. (2013) find that the larger 
banks are able to take advantage of these opportunities when industry deregulation 
expanded these banks’ growth opportunities. Bertay et al. (2013) show that bank 
returns increase with absolute size because large banks are subject to greater market 
discipline, yet decline with systemic size.  
 
Loans: For Chinese banks, deposits and loans are the most important business 
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throughout decades. Banks obtain low cost fund by giving lower interest rates for 
deposits. A large portion of these funds are loaned to enterprises and individual 
borrowers to generate interest income. Jiang et al. (2013) find that Chinese banks are 
more efficient in generating interest revenue than non-interest income. Moreover, 
loans might be more profitable than other types of assets, such as securities and other 
types of investment; therefore, a positive coefficient sign is expected for this variable 
in the regression.  
 
Capital adequacy: Better capitalized banks may reflect higher management quality, 
thereby generating a higher profit. As pointed out by Berger and Bouwman (2013), 
well capitalized bank face lower expected bankruptcy costs, which in turn increase 
their shareholders’ return. Moreover, regulators require banks to hold a minimum 
level of capital as a percentage of risk-weighted assets. Higher levels of capital may 
therefore indicate banks with riskier assets. 
 
Non-performing loans: This variable is used to proxy for asset quality. Lower loan 
quality typically indicates more resources on credit underwriting and loan monitoring, 
thus reduce profitability.  
 
Block shareholder numbers: This variable is the number of shareholders whose single 
holding exceeds 5% of total shares outstanding of the bank. Block shareholders may 
have incentive to extract private benefit from bank and have a negative effect on a 
bank’s profitability.  
 
Board size: Corporate governance plays a special role due to the uniqueness of 
banking sector. The consensus is that complex firms, which need a greater level of 
advising and monitoring, thus have larger boards. Small numbers of board may 
difficult to monitor managers due to the idiosyncratic nature of banking business. 
However, more board members would increase the free rider problem. De Andres and 
20 
 
Vallelado (2008) find that an inverted U-shaped relation between bank performance 
and board size. Jiang et al. (2013) find board size has a significantly negative impact 
on bank performance.  
 
Independent directors: It is not enough merely to appoint more executive directors to 
safeguard the efficacy of supervision and advising for a bank. Independent directors 
should be appointed to monitor and discipline mangers. De Andres and Vallelado 
(2008) suggest that that larger and not excessively independent boards might prove 
more efficient in monitoring and advising functions, and create more value. Jiang et al. 
(2013) find the proportion of independent directors have significantly positive impacts 
on both bank performance and asset quality. 
 
Table 2: Definition of variables 
Variables Symbol Description  Sources 
Performance variables    
Return on assets  ROA The ratio of profit to total assets. Bankscope 
Return on equity ROE The ratio of profit to equity. Bankscope 
    
Ownership variables    
Government 
ownership 
STATE The percentage of shares held by 
government 
Manual collection 
SOE ownership  SOE The percentage of shares held by state 
owned enterprises (SOE) 
Manual collection 
Domestic private 
ownership  
DPO The percentage of shares held by 
domestic private owners 
Manual collection 
Foreign ownership FOR The percentage of shares held by 
foreign investors 
Manual collection 
Ownership type 
diversity 
DIV The diversification for ownership 
type diversity and calculated from 
equation 2 
Use original 
ownership data to 
calculate 
Ownership 
concentration 
CONC The sum of the squared ownership 
shares of top the largest ten 
shareholders of the bank 
Use original 
ownership data to 
calculate 
Top 3 ownership  TOP3 The sum of the percentage of equity 
shares owned by the top three 
shareholders 
Use original 
ownership data to 
calculate 
    
Control variables     
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Bank size LNTA The natural logarithm of total assets 
in thousands of Chinese Yuan 
Bankscope 
Loans LTD Ratio of total loans to total deposit Bankscope 
Capital adequacy CAR Risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio Bankscope 
Non-performing loan  NPL Ratio of non-performing loans to total 
loans 
Bankscope 
Block shareholder 
numbers 
BLO The number of block shareholders, 
whose holding exceeds 5% of total 
shares outstanding of the bank 
Annual reports 
Board size BS The number of board members Annual reports 
Independent board 
members 
IND The number of non-executive 
directors in the board 
Annual reports 
 
It is reasonable to believe that the role played by different types of owners in banks' 
performance behaviors is conditional on their incentives as reflected by the ownership 
type diversity and concentration, i.e., the relation between performance and the 
ownership type diversity and the degree of ownership concentration. To explore this 
issue, I use the following regression model: 
 
𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜀1𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡×𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀2𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡×𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀3𝐷𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑡×𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜀4𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡×𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀5𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡×𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀6𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡×𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜀7𝐷𝑃𝑂𝑖𝑡×𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀8𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡×𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛴𝑘𝛿𝑘𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(Equation 3) 
 
where the interaction terms are included in the model as the output of the ownership 
type diversity (DIV) and concentration (CONC) with the percentage of each 
ownership type, respectively. Other control variables are as defined as above. If the 
coefficients of the interaction terms are statistically significant, this imply that the 
impacts of ownership type diversity and concentration on performance varies across 
those ownership types. 
 
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 presents statistics for all variables. The mean (median) of ROA is 1.13% 
22 
 
(1.12%) with standard deviation of 0.42%, and minimum and maximum values of 
0.05% and 2.39% respectively. This figure is similar as the value given by Lin and 
Zhang (2009). The mean (median) ROE is 17.71% (17.64%). 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for main model variables 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Performance variables     
ROA 830 1.14 0.43 0.05 2.39 
ROE 830 17.87 6.86 0.63 39.72 
      
Ownership variables 
STATE 830 7.22 10.18 0.00 39.21 
SOE 830 25.16 22.66 0.00 90.15 
DPO 830 14.36 17.02 0.00 67.33 
FOR 830 3.88 7.14 0.00 20.00 
DIV 830 1.81 0.6 1.00 2.99 
CONC 830 0.21 0.14 0.00 0.74 
TOP3 830 0.42 0.18 0.16 0.92 
      
Control variables     
LNTA 830 16.32 1.79 13.19 21.19 
LTD 830 60.76 10.64 28.34 78.45 
CAR 830 12.96 3.18 5.77 30.14 
NPL 830 1.31 1.18 0.00 8.21 
BLO 830 4.22 2.15 0.00 10.00 
BS 830 12.88 2.94 6.00 19.00 
IND 830 3.09 1.85 0.00 7.00 
      
Note: ROA is ratio of profit to the book value of total assets. ROE is ratio of profit to the book value of total equity. STATE is the 
percentage of equity shares held by government owners. SOE is the percentage of equity shares held by state owned enterprises (SOE) 
owners. DPO is the percentage of equity shares held by domestic private owners. FOR is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
owners. DIV is the diversification for ownership type diversity and calculated from equation 2. CONC is the sum of the squared ownership 
shares held by top ten largest shareholders. TOP3 is the total percentage of equity shares owned by the largest three shareholders. LNTA is 
the natural logarithm for the amount of total assets in thousands of Chinese Yuan. LTD is the ratio of total loans to total deposit. CAR is 
risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. NPL is the ratio of the amount of non-performing loans over the amount of total loans. BLO is the 
number of block shareholders. BS is the number of board members. IND is the total number of independent member in the board.  
 
Regarding ownership structure, the state ownership has a mean of 7.21% with 
standard deviation of 10.18%, and minimum and maximum of 0% and 39%. In 
addition, the SOE owners holds an average stake of 25.18% in those commercial 
banks. The domestic private investors and foreign investors holds an average stake of 
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14.37% and 3.89%. furthermore, the mean (median) of the ownership type diversity is 
1.80 (1.80). The mean (median) of the ownership concentration is 0.21 (0.15), with a 
small degree of variation across sample. 
 
With regard to the control variables, the range of capital adequacy ratio is from 5.77% 
to 30.14%, with an average of 13.19%. This figure is comparable to the figure 
reported in Dong et al. (2014). The mean (median) NPL is 1.31% (1.03%). 
 
The correlation between variables is used to identify whether there is a significant 
relationship between the ownership type and the performance. Table (4) shows the 
correlation matrix, which shows the relationship between all pairs of variables in the 
regression model. The correlation matrix indicates that state ownership (STATE) is 
not significantly related to two of the two performance measures, the return on assets 
(ROA), and the return on equity (ROE). However, SOE ownership (SOE) is 
significantly negatively related to ROA and ROE. Foreign ownership (FOR) is also 
significantly negatively related to ROA, but not significantly related to ROE. In 
addition, private domestic ownership (PDO) is significantly positively related to both 
ROA and ROE. Furthermore, ownership type diversity (DIV) is significantly 
positively related to ROA and ROE, and ownership concentration (CONC) is 
significantly negatively related to both ROA and ROE. Although I observe significant 
correlation among the measures of performance variables, but there are not be used in 
same model. In general, there is no evidence of severe multicollinearity. 
 
Table 4: The matrix of Pearson correlation coefficients 
 ROA ROE STATE SOE DPO FOR DIV CONC 
ROA 1.000        
ROE 0.6835* 1.000       
STATE 0.0256 0.0367 1.000      
SOE -0.2905* -0.1922* -0.1908* 1.000     
DPO 0.2195* 0.0971* -0.0272 -0.3855* 1.000    
FOR -0.1966* -0.0261 -0.1087* 0.1146* -0.2816* 1.000   
DIV 0.1244* 0.0911* 0.4770* -0.2431* 0.1090* 0.2375* 1.000  
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CONC -0.1660* -0.0835* 0.0338 0.6410* -0.3978* 0.0998* -0.3075* 1.000 
TOP3 -0.2134* -0.1232* 0.1884* 0.7436* -0.2477* 0.2305* -0.0646 0.7885* 
LNTA -0.1346* 0.0655 -0.0483 0.2801* -0.4228* 0.3179* -0.1244* 0.4500* 
LTD -0.0336 -0.0329 -0.1146* -0.0133 -0.0852* 0.1245* -0.03 0.0147 
CAR 0.2160* -0.1602* -0.0157 -0.0022 0.1425* -0.0774* 0.0736* -0.0696* 
NPL -0.3412* -0.2524* 0.0850* 0.0032 -0.1801* 0.0313 -0.0247 0.0851* 
BLO 0.0441 -0.0186 0.0721* -0.0366 0.6979* -0.0928* 0.2743* -0.4306* 
BS -0.1284* -0.0382 -0.1001* -0.0073 -0.1839* 0.2494* -0.0116 -0.0137 
IND -0.1176* -0.0385 -0.0841* 0.0765* -0.3162* 0.2771* -0.0547 0.1768* 
         
 TOP3 LNTA LTD CAR NPL BLO BS IND 
TOP3 1.000        
LNTA 0.3000* 1.000       
LTD -0.0695* 0.2277* 1.000      
CAR -0.0054 -0.2204* -0.1305* 1.000     
NPL 0.0484 0.0093 0.0849* -0.2916* 1.000    
BLO -0.2031* -0.3931* -0.0780* 0.1273* -0.1546* 1.000   
BS -0.1124* 0.5084* 0.2436* -0.0911* -0.0013 -0.0730* 1.000  
IND 0.0394 0.6735* 0.2591* -0.0949* -0.0629 -0.2699* 0.6725* 1.000 
         
Note: ROA is ratio of profit to the book value of total assets. ROE is ratio of profit to the book value of total equity. STATE is the 
percentage of equity shares held by government owners. SOE is the percentage of equity shares held by state owned enterprises (SOE) 
owners. DPO is the percentage of equity shares held by domestic private owners. FOR is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
owners. DIV is the diversification for ownership type diversity and calculated from equation 2. CONC is the sum of the squared ownership 
shares held by top ten largest shareholders. TOP3 is the total percentage of equity shares owned by the largest three shareholders. LNTA is 
the natural logarithm for the amount of total assets in thousands of Chinese Yuan. LTD is the ratio of total loans to total deposit. CAR is 
risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. NPL is the ratio of the amount of non-performing loans over the amount of total loans. BLO is the 
number of block shareholders. BS is the number of board members. IND is the total number of independent member in the board. 
 
 
5 Empirical results  
5.1 OLS estimation results 
These regressions for the estimations of the relationship between the ownership 
structures and performance are presented from Tables (5) to (7). In the estimation, 
there is a significant relationship for performance and the different types of 
ownership. 
 
Table 5: The relationship between ownership and bank performance (only individual type 
ownership) - OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variable 
 ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
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STATE  0.001    -0.002 
  (0.74)    (-1.14)    
SOE   -0.006***   -0.005*** 
   (-8.82)   (-6.93)    
DPO    0.006***  0.002**  
    (6.54)  (2.05) 
FOR     -0.012*** -0.009*** 
     (-5.83) (-4.41)    
       
Constant  1.130*** 1.278*** 1.058*** 1.184*** 1.278*** 
  (62.34) (60.30) (55.94) (71.83) (36.09) 
       
       
Observation  830 830 830 830 830 
F test  0.554 77.801 42.74 33.941 28.172 
R  0.001 0.084 0.048 0.039 0.118 
       
Note: ROA is ratio of profit to the book value of total assets. ROE is ratio of profit to the book value of total equity. STATE is the 
percentage of equity shares held by government owners. SOE is the percentage of equity shares held by state owned enterprises (SOE) 
owners. DPO is the percentage of equity shares held by domestic private owners. FOR is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
owners. DIV is the diversification for ownership type diversity and calculated from equation 2. CONC is the sum of the squared 
ownership shares held by top ten largest shareholders. TOP3 is the total percentage of equity shares owned by the largest three 
shareholders. LNTA is the natural logarithm for the amount of total assets in thousands of Chinese Yuan. LTD is the ratio of total loans to 
total deposit. CAR is risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. NPL is the ratio of the amount of non-performing loans over the amount of 
total loans. BLO is the number of block shareholders. BS is the number of board members. IND is the total number of independent 
member in the board. 
 
In Table (5), the fundamentals variables are being used individually. A number of 
interesting results show in the results. First, in the column (1) of Table (5), there is no 
statistically relationship between the state shareholding and performance. This 
indicates the state shareholders may not create enough incentive environment and 
condition for the managers that is conducive to knowledge transfer for enhancing the 
performance. These results are in line with Altunbas et al. (2001) and Micco et al. 
(2007), who find no evidence that state-owned banks are less profitable than private 
banks. In addition, this result further extends the findings of Fu and Heffernan (2009), 
who investigate the relation between market structure and performance in China’s 
banking system from 1985 to 2002 and find no evidence to support the quiet-life 
hypothesis in state owned banks. The influence of government ownership on the bank 
performance is especially complex, as governments impose non-profit-maximizing 
social and political objectives yet also provide implicit guarantees against default. 
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Moreover, this evidence also can be explained that the state-owned banks do not 
enjoy monopoly profits, probably because strict interest rate control.  
 
Second, in the column (2) of Table (5), there is a statistically negative relationship 
between the extent of SOE ownership i.e., the percentage of SOE shareholding (SOE) 
and performance measures. Specifically, the SOE ownership has a coefficient of 
-0.005 with a t-value of -8.86 which is significant at 1%. The result is not surprising 
as in many cases SOE shareholders tend to satisfy their personal interest instead of 
aligning their interest with that of the bank. Thus, agency problems could be a source 
of worse performing due to it explains why external pressures, which influence the 
effort of management, may fail to coerce maximal effort from managers. In highly 
competitive markets, external pressures are expected to strengthen management’s 
incentive to be operating efficiently. In addition, increase SOE shareholding may 
encourage a lack of discipline and risk taking behaviour. The notion of economically 
efficient SOE owned banks is contentious and revolves around alternative views of 
government benevolence. Hypothesis (2) is fully confirmed by the this results, banks 
with high SOE ownership are associated with worse performance. 
 
Third, in the column (3) of Table (5), there is a statistically positive relationship 
between the domestic private ownership i.e., the percentage of domestic private 
shareholding (DPO) and performance measures. Specifically, the DPO ownership has 
a coefficient of 0.00 with a t-value of 6.515 which is significant at 1%. The result 
indicates that banks with more private domestic shareholders are perform better. The 
finding is consistent with literature, for instance, Williams and Nguyen (2005). 
Domestic private owners might require management implement certain operational 
strategies in order to achieve their returns. This, in turn, results in better performance. 
In addition, this result can be explained by the finding of Jiang et al. (2013), who 
claims that the bank performance is improved after privatization with respect to 
revenue inflow and efficiency. Domestic shareholders in the bank’s control chain is an 
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advantage source of skills and expertise that help banks with activity diversification 
(Saghi-Zedek, 2016). Moreover, Altunbas et al. (2001) also conclude that privately 
owned banks are more efficient that their counterparts. Indeed, private domestic 
ownership is expected to reduce agency problems thereby promoting profitability 
because these shareholders exercise due diligence and monitor manager efficiently. 
Shaban and James (2017) find that domestic investors tend to select the best 
performing banks. Hence, the results confirm Hypothesis (3).  
 
Fourth, in the column (4) of Table (5), there is a statistically negative relationship 
between the foreign ownership i.e., the percentage of foreign shareholding (FOR) and 
performance measure. Specifically, the FOR variable has a coefficient of -0.012 with 
a t-value of -5.85 which is significant at 1%. This indicates that higher foreign 
ownership may negatively affect bank performance. This result is in line with the 
finding of Lensink et al. (2008), who also find that foreign ownership negatively 
affects bank performance. Besides, this result can be interpreted that foreign owners 
may find it difficult than domestic owners to deal with a host country’s regulation or 
related banking supervision requirements. Indeed, foreign shareholders may face 
strong domestic networks and may also encourage managers to increase shareholder 
returns through greater risk-taking (Garcia-Meca et al., 2015). Consistent with the 
finding of Lee and Hsieh (2014), they find that the home field advantage hypothesis is 
existence. The results confirm Hypothesis (4). 
 
However, this result is contrast with findings in Berger et al., (2005) that foreign 
ownership helps mitigate loss of profit or increase in costs from diversification. Jiang 
et al., (2013) also find that more shares of foreign ownership associated with the high 
level of cost efficiency. Micco et al. (2007) also offer evidence that foreign ownership 
improves a bank’s performance through profit increases and cost downs. 
 
In the column (5) of Table (4), the coefficients of SOE and FOR are negative and 
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significant, while the coefficient of DPO is positive and significant, which in line with 
other specifications.  
 
In table (6), I add the ownership type diversity (DIV) and concentration (CONC) 
variables, while the table also presents the results for individual type shareholders. 
The signs of the coefficients on STATE, SOE, DPO and FOR are relatively consistent 
with regression results in Table (5).  
 
Table 6: The relationship between ownership and bank performance (without control 
variables) - OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variable 
 ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
STATE  -0.001    -0.006*** 
  (-0.04)    (-3.74)    
SOE   -0.006***   -0.006*** 
   (-6.92)   (-6.81)    
DPO    0.005***  0.002**  
    (5.61)  (2.15) 
FOR     -0.013*** -0.013*** 
     (-6.28) (-5.86)    
DIV  0.060** 0.048* 0.063** 0.104*** 0.153*** 
  (2.04) (1.95) (2.55) (4.04) (5.01) 
CONC  -0.407*** 0.142 -0.13 -0.289*** -0.473*** 
  (-3.66) (-1.07) (-1.10) (-2.67) (3.37) 
       
Constant  1.111*** 1.158*** 0.970*** 1.057*** 0.971*** 
  (17.94) (20.08) (15.35) (18.16) (15.22) 
       
Observation  830 830 830 830 830 
F test  9.088 25.586 19.935 22.679 23.261 
R  0.032 0.085 0.067 0.076 0.144 
       
Note: ROA is ratio of profit to the book value of total assets. ROE is ratio of profit to the book value of total equity. STATE is the 
percentage of equity shares held by government owners. SOE is the percentage of equity shares held by state owned enterprises (SOE) 
owners. DPO is the percentage of equity shares held by domestic private owners. FOR is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
owners. DIV is the diversification for ownership type diversity and calculated from equation 2. CONC is the sum of the squared 
ownership shares held by top ten largest shareholders. TOP3 is the total percentage of equity shares owned by the largest three 
shareholders. LNTA is the natural logarithm for the amount of total assets in thousands of Chinese Yuan. LTD is the ratio of total loans to 
total deposit. CAR is risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. NPL is the ratio of the amount of non-performing loans over the amount of 
total loans. BLO is the number of block shareholders. BS is the number of board members. IND is the total number of independent 
member in the board. 
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There is a statistically positive relationship between the extent of ownership type 
diversity (DIV) and bank performance variables in all columns of Table (6). 
Specifically, in column (5) of Table (6), the ownership type diversity has a coefficient 
of 0.153 with a t-value of 5.01 which is significant at 1%. 
 
More generally, firms with few large, undiversified shareholders such as founding 
owners may forgo maximum profits because they are unable to separate their financial 
preferences with those of outside or minority shareholders. Founding owners often 
limit executive management positions to the members who may have relation. These 
are suggesting a restricted human resource from which to obtain qualified and capable 
talent, potentially leading to competitive disadvantages relative to other firms. 
 
There is a statistically negative relationship between the extent of ownership 
concentration (CONC) and bank performance variables in three columns of Table (6). 
Specifically, in column (5) of Table (6), the CONC has a coefficient of -0.473 with a 
t-value of 3.37 which is significant at 1%. The results are suggesting that banks with 
concentrated ownership are poorer performing.  
 
The results can be explained by the views that for the expropriation of minority 
shareholders in banks, which contrast with the finding of Caprio et al. (2007). 
Although the dispersed owners lack both the means and the motive to address 
managerial agency problems, but the incentives of the controlling shareholders are 
more likely to expropriate resources from the corporation. This situation is generally 
known as “tunneling,” and is commonly defined as “the transfer of assets and 
revenues out of firms for the benefit of their controlling shareholders”.  
 
A stream of corporate governance research indicates specifically on large shareholders 
attempts to expropriate smaller shareholders. Fama and Jensen (1983) claim that 
combining ownership and control allows concentrated shareholders to exchange 
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profits for private rents. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that large premiums 
associated with superior voting shares or control rights provide incentive that larger 
shareholders seek to extract private benefits from the firm. Indeed, higher ownership 
concentration may increase the power for shareholder to monitor management, but it 
may also increase the risk for the power abuse by large controlling shareholders.  
 
Typically, in column (5) of Table (6), STATE ownership has a coefficient of -0.006 
with a t-value of -3.74 which is significant at 1%. This result indicate that state 
ownership of banks has been associated with subpar bank performance (Cornett et al., 
2010; Berger et al., 2009a; Lensink et al., 2008; Lin and Zhang, 2009). The 
underperformance of the banks associated with high state ownership is consistent with 
the theoretical arguments of the agency view, the social view, and the political view of 
state ownership. 
 
The political view claims that government control of financial institutions politicizes 
resource allocation for the sake of advancing certain political agendas, and, by 
pursuing such objectives, economic efficiency is impaired (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
In another word, state ownership of commercial banks was used to assist national 
economic development policies. In fact, the political views should not be seen as 
corner solutions without any intermediate possibility; it is possible that state-owned 
banks are mandated to engage with some political lending. In addition, the state 
shareholders may act as both owner and regulator of its banks. As consequence, some 
banks might be either too-big-to-fail or too-important-to-fail which would allow 
worse performing banks to survive. This view can be support by the finding of Faccio 
et al. (2006), who find that politically connected firms are significantly more likely to 
be bailed out than similar nonconnected firms. Furthermore, the free-rider problem 
becomes obvious in government owned banks. State ownership means that every 
citizen is shareholder, which suggest that shareholders may have no power and 
incentive to monitor the managers. Indeed, the inferior performance of state-owned 
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banks may due to the perverse incentives of political bureaucrats who influence the 
operation of state-owned banks. My findings provide further support for the political 
view of public banks and corroborate previous findings by Micco et al. (2007), who 
find that state owned banks tend to have lower profitability and higher costs than their 
private counterparts in developing countries.  
 
Again, the signs of the coefficients on SOE, DPO and FOR are relatively consistent 
with regression results in previous specifications. Specifically, the SOE ownership has 
a coefficient of -0.006 with a t-value of -6.81, which is significant at 1% in column (5) 
of Table (6). DPO ownership has a coefficient of 0.002 with a t-value of 2.15, which 
is significant at 1% in column (5) of Table (6). Moreover, FOR ownership has a 
coefficient of -0.013 with a t-value of -5.86, which is significant at 1% in column (5) 
of Table (6). 
 
The regression results in Table (6) supports proposed hypotheses. Ownership type 
diversity has a statistically and positively significant effect on performance variable in 
all estimations. The R2 values, which demonstrates the quality of estimations, 
increase significantly when ownership type diversity is added in the regressions (e.g., 
R2 increases from 3.2% in column 1 to 14.4% in column 5), suggesting that 
ownership diversity and concentration are the essential explanatory factors for 
determining bank performance. 
 
In table (7), I present the full model by adding all control variables as equation (1), 
while the table also presents the results for individual type shareholders from column 
(1) to (4). Again, the signs of the coefficients on STATE, SOE, DPO and FOR are 
relatively consistent with regression results in previous specifications. The coefficient 
for STATE is negative and significant at the 1% level in column (5) instead of column 
(1) of Table (7). In addition, the coefficients for SOE are negative and significant at 
the 1% level in both column (2) and column (5) of Table (7). Moreover, the 
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coefficient for DPO is positive and significant at the 1% level in column (3) of Table 
(7). However, for column (5) of Table (7), this result breaks down. It is still positive, 
yet no longer significant. Furthermore, the coefficients for FOR are negative and 
significant at the 1% level in both column (4) and column (5) of Table (7). 
 
Table 7: The relationship between ownership and bank performance (full model) - OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variable 
 ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
STATE  0.002    -0.005*** 
  (0.98)    (-3.00) 
SOE   -0.007***   -0.007*** 
   (-8.23)   (-6.33) 
DPO    0.007***  0.001 
    -6.18  (-0.28) 
FOR     -0.011*** -0.011*** 
     (-5.53) (-5.25) 
DIV  0.058** 0.047** 0.092*** 0.112*** 0.131*** 
  (2.11) (2.06) (3.91) (4.57) (4.59) 
CONC  -0.434*** -0.384** -0.339*** -0.406*** -0.509*** 
  (-3.26) (-2.41) (-2.61) (-3.13) (-2.76) 
LNTA  -0.003 0.004 0.003 0.009 0.016 
  (-0.27) -0.3 -0.28 -0.73 -1.32 
LTD  0.002* 0.002 0.002 0.002* 0.002 
  (1.70) (1.54) (1.48) (1.85) (1.39) 
CAR  0.014*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 
  (3.09) (3.50) (3.04) (3.09) (3.42) 
NPL  -0.131*** -0.133*** -0.120*** -0.126*** -0.125*** 
  (-9.86) (-10.42) (-9.19) (-9.67) (-9.79) 
BLO  -0.021*** 0.003 -0.056*** -0.024*** 0.004 
  (-2.69) -0.37 (-5.87) (-3.07) -0.3 
BS  -0.012* -0.012** -0.01 -0.01 -0.011* 
  (-1.89) (-1.99) (-1.51) (-1.60) (-1.82) 
IND  -0.015 -0.017 -0.013 -0.014 -0.016 
  (-1.29) (-1.50) (-1.15) (-1.21) (-1.48) 
       
Constant  1.303*** 1.121*** 1.144*** 1.022*** 0.834*** 
  (6.00) (5.34) (5.35) (4.66) (3.92) 
       
Observation  830 830 830 830 830 
F test  18.225 26.377 22.77 21.843 23.426 
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R  0.182 0.244 0.218 0.211 0.272 
       
Note: ROA is ratio of profit to the book value of total assets. ROE is ratio of profit to the book value of total equity. STATE is the 
percentage of equity shares held by government owners. SOE is the percentage of equity shares held by state owned enterprises (SOE) 
owners. DPO is the percentage of equity shares held by domestic private owners. FOR is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
owners. DIV is the diversification for ownership type diversity and calculated from equation 2. CONC is the sum of the squared 
ownership shares held by top ten largest shareholders. TOP3 is the total percentage of equity shares owned by the largest three 
shareholders. LNTA is the natural logarithm for the amount of total assets in thousands of Chinese Yuan. LTD is the ratio of total loans to 
total deposit. CAR is risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. NPL is the ratio of the amount of non-performing loans over the amount of 
total loans. BLO is the number of block shareholders. BS is the number of board members. IND is the total number of independent 
member in the board. 
 
Regarding the control variables in the efficiency equation it appears that most 
variables are in line with expectation. The coefficients on the majority control 
variables are significant, except for that of LNTA and IND. The coefficients of loan to 
deposit ratio (LTD) have a statistically significant and positive effect on performance 
in column (1) and (4) of Table (7), which suggests that banks with more loans are 
likely to associate with higher return for the shareholders. The result is in line with the 
finding of Jiang et al. (2013). In addition, the coefficients of non-performing loan 
ratio (NPL) have a statistically significant and negative effect on performance in 
column (1) and (4) of Table (7), which suggest that banks with lower non-performing 
loan are better perform and more profitable. Furthermore, consistent with the finding 
of Liang et al. (2013), board size has a significantly negative impact on bank 
performance. 
 
The coefficients of bank sizes (LNTA) have no statistically significant. The result is 
consistent with the finding of Micco et al. (2007), who find no correlation between 
absolute bank size and ROA for banks located in developing countries. 
 
Adding these control variables greatly increases the explanatory power of the model, 
but leaves the significance levels and relative magnitudes of the various ownership 
coefficient unchanged. Although the control variables together explain the different 
type of owner’s share of the total variation in performance across banks, marginal 
changes in diversity and concentration are still associated with statistically significant. 
The R2 values increase significantly after control variables added in the estimations 
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(e.g., R2 increases from 18.2% in Column 1 to 27.2% in Column 5), meaning that 
these control variables are reasonable explanatory factor determining bank 
performance. 
 
5.2 Fixed effect estimation 
In Table (8), the results still clearly suggest that bank ownership matters. In both 
column (1) and (5), the coefficient on STATE is negatively and significantly at 10% 
and 5%. This results confirm the previous findings that banks with more percentage 
shares holding by government are associated with lower profitability. In addition, the 
coefficient on DPO is positively and significantly at 5% and 10% on column (3) and 
(5) respectively. This results confirm the previous findings that banks with more 
shares holding by domestic provide investors are associated with better performing. 
Moreover, the coefficient on DIV is positively and significantly at 1% on all five 
columns. 
 
Table 8: The relationship between ownership and bank performance (without control 
variables) – Fixed effect  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variable 
 ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
STATE  -0.006*    -0.007**  
  (-1.75)    (-2.00)    
SOE   -0.001   -0.002 
   (-0.97)   (-1.25)    
DPO    0.004**  0.003*   
    (2.18)  (1.71) 
FOR     0.000 0.000 
     (0.12) (0.04) 
DIV  0.209*** 0.204*** 0.193*** 0.198*** 0.213*** 
  (4.91) (4.78) (4.57) (4.56) (4.77) 
CONC  0.021 -0.08 -0.076 -0.151 0.236 
  (0.08) (-0.30) (-0.29) (-0.58) (0.78) 
       
Constant  0.793*** 0.818*** 0.747*** 0.805*** 0.759*** 
  (8.00) (8.19) (7.30) (8.11) (7.28) 
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Observation  830 830 830 830 830 
F test  8.84 8.101 9.411 7.784 5.433 
R  0.036 0.033 0.039 0.032 0.045 
       
Note: ROA is ratio of profit to the book value of total assets. ROE is ratio of profit to the book value of total equity. STATE is the 
percentage of equity shares held by government owners. SOE is the percentage of equity shares held by state owned enterprises (SOE) 
owners. DPO is the percentage of equity shares held by domestic private owners. FOR is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
owners. DIV is the diversification for ownership type diversity and calculated from equation 2. CONC is the sum of the squared 
ownership shares held by top ten largest shareholders. TOP3 is the total percentage of equity shares owned by the largest three 
shareholders. LNTA is the natural logarithm for the amount of total assets in thousands of Chinese Yuan. LTD is the ratio of total loans to 
total deposit. CAR is risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. NPL is the ratio of the amount of non-performing loans over the amount of 
total loans. BLO is the number of block shareholders. BS is the number of board members. IND is the total number of independent 
member in the board. 
 
The Table (9) results indicate that controlling for these other bank-specific 
characteristics does not change previous findings. In particular, NPL enters negatively 
and significantly as expected. 
 
Table 9: The relationship between ownership and bank performance (full model) – Fixed 
effect 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variable 
 ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
STATE  0.003    -0.001 
  (0.90)    (-0.15)    
SOE   -0.004***   -0.004**  
   (-2.86)   (-2.12)    
DPO    0.003*  0.00 
    (1.71)  (0.01) 
FOR     -0.001 -0.002 
     (-0.30) (-0.43)    
DIV  0.172*** 0.183*** 0.184*** 0.181*** 0.188*** 
  (4.25) (4.61) (4.61) (4.42) (4.49) 
CONC  -0.129 0.243 -0.083 -0.061 0.251 
  (-0.48) (0.90) (-0.33) (-0.24) (0.75) 
LNTA  0.024 0.021 0.019 0.018 0.02 
  (1.25) (1.16) (1.06) (0.99) (1.01) 
LTD  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-0.85) (-0.71) (-0.78) (-0.82) (-0.69)    
CAR  0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.006 
  (1.38) (1.45) (1.33) (1.30) (1.43) 
NPL  -0.114*** -0.115*** -0.112*** -0.113*** -0.115*** 
  (-10.02) (-10.19) (-9.92) (-9.96) (-10.10)    
BLO  0.016 0.025** -0.001 0.015 0.024 
  (1.51) (2.21) (-0.08) (1.41) (1.31) 
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BS  -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
  (-0.20) (-0.11) (-0.13) (-0.29) (-0.11)    
IND  -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
  (-0.10) (0.02) (0.06) (-0.07) (-0.02)    
       
Constant  0.54 0.552 0.615* 0.650* 0.581 
  (1.41) (1.51) (1.68) (1.77) (1.51) 
       
Observation  830 830 830 830 830 
F test  16.917 17.836 17.182 16.828 13.68 
R  0.197 0.205 0.199 0.196 0.206 
       
Note: ROA is ratio of profit to the book value of total assets. ROE is ratio of profit to the book value of total equity. STATE is the 
percentage of equity shares held by government owners. SOE is the percentage of equity shares held by state owned enterprises (SOE) 
owners. DPO is the percentage of equity shares held by domestic private owners. FOR is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
owners. DIV is the diversification for ownership type diversity and calculated from equation 2. CONC is the sum of the squared 
ownership shares held by top ten largest shareholders. TOP3 is the total percentage of equity shares owned by the largest three 
shareholders. LNTA is the natural logarithm for the amount of total assets in thousands of Chinese Yuan. LTD is the ratio of total loans to 
total deposit. CAR is risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. NPL is the ratio of the amount of non-performing loans over the amount of 
total loans. BLO is the number of block shareholders. BS is the number of board members. IND is the total number of independent 
member in the board. 
 
 
5.3 Interacting different types of owners with ownership type diversity and 
concentration  
 
Table 6 reports the results of Equation (3) that examines how the different types of 
owners in banks' performance behaviors is conditional on the ownership type 
diversity and concentration. In another word, the marginal effect of percentage of 
shareholding by different owners may depend on the ownership type diversity and the 
level of ownership concentration.  
 
In column (1) of Table (10), the coefficient on the interaction between STATE and 
DIV is not significantly affected. However, CONC is negatively and significantly at 
5%, while the interaction term STATE and CONC enters negatively and significantly 
at 1%. The result can be explained that the negative impact of STATE shareholders on 
bank performance are pronounced among banks with concentrated ownership. 
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In column (2) of Table (10), the coefficient on the interaction between SOE and DIV 
is positively and significantly at 5%, while the interaction term SOE and CONC 
enters also positively and significantly. The results suggest that the negative impact of 
SOE shareholders on bank performance are reduced on banks with ownership type 
diversity and concentrated ownership.  
 
In column (4) of Table (10), the coefficient on the interaction between FOR and 
CONC is positively and significantly at 1%, while the coefficient of interaction 
between FOR and DIV is not significantly affected. The result indicates that that FOR 
and CONC reduce bank performance, but the marginal effect of each diminishes as 
the other increases. In other words, the results suggest that the negative impact of 
FOR shareholders on bank performance are reduced when banks with concentrated 
ownership.  
 
The column (5) of Table (10) results indicates that including all variables does not 
change previous findings. For instance, the coefficient on interaction term STATE and 
CONC is still negatively and significantly at 1%. The coefficients on interaction term 
SOE and DIV is positively and significantly. 
 
Table 10: The relationship between ownership and bank performance (interaction without 
control variables)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variable 
 ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
DIV  0.034 -0.000 0.027 0.108*** 0.048 
  (0.89) (-0.00) (0.77) (3.82) (0.70) 
CONC  -0.265** -0.757*** -0.154 -0.482*** 0.544 
  (-2.20) (-2.73) (-1.27) (-3.98) (1.24) 
STATE  0.007    -0.003 
  (1.10)    (-0.45)    
STATE * DIV 0.001    0.001 
  (0.44)    (0.54) 
STATE * CONC -0.035***    -0.025**  
  (-3.59)    (-2.28)    
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SOE   -0.015***   -0.013*** 
   (-4.57)   (-3.59)    
SOE * DIV  0.004**   0.004**  
   (2.10)   (2.26) 
SOE * CONC  0.018***   0.002 
   (3.93)   (0.39) 
DPO    0.001  0.000 
    -0.21  (-0.11)    
DPO * DIV   0.002  0.002 
    (1.39)  (1.01) 
SOE * CONC   0.004  -0.008 
    (0.20)  (-0.41)    
FOR     -0.025*** -0.007 
     (-2.84) (-0.75)    
FOR * DIV    -0.001 -0.005 
     (-0.41) (-1.54)    
FOR * CONC    0.069*** 0.024 
     (3.53) (1.14) 
       
Constant  1.111*** 1.387*** 1.030*** 1.087*** 1.127*** 
  (14.71) (16.25) (13.45) (17.11) (7.70) 
       
Observation  830 830 830 830 830 
F test  8.135 18.742 12.354 16.58 11.637 
R  0.047 0.102 0.069 0.091 0.166 
       
Note: ROA is ratio of profit to the book value of total assets. ROE is ratio of profit to the book value of total equity. STATE is the 
percentage of equity shares held by government owners. SOE is the percentage of equity shares held by state owned enterprises (SOE) 
owners. DPO is the percentage of equity shares held by domestic private owners. FOR is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
owners. DIV is the diversification for ownership type diversity and calculated from equation 2. CONC is the sum of the squared 
ownership shares held by top ten largest shareholders. TOP3 is the total percentage of equity shares owned by the largest three 
shareholders. LNTA is the natural logarithm for the amount of total assets in thousands of Chinese Yuan. LTD is the ratio of total loans to 
total deposit. CAR is risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. NPL is the ratio of the amount of non-performing loans over the amount of 
total loans. BLO is the number of block shareholders. BS is the number of board members. IND is the total number of independent 
member in the board. 
 
Perhaps as a result of so many inconsistencies, previous researchers have typically 
pointed out that the fragile relation between ownership and performance may be 
explained in terms of certain “conditional factors”. To determine which variable 
affects the relation between ownership and performance and whether these factors 
enhance or weaken this relation, I further adopt equation (3) to investigate the 
interaction effects of the variables for different types of ownership, ownership 
diversity, and concentration on bank performance on Table (11). 
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In particular, ownership type diversity remains a consistently positive effect on bank 
performance (Column 4 of Table 11) and ownership concentration has a consistently 
negative effect on bank performance (Column 1, 3 and 4 of Table 11). 
 
Table (11) results indicate that controlling for these other bank-specific characteristics 
does not change the findings. In addition, these control variables enter significantly as 
expected, but this does not affect the study’s core results on the impact of ownership 
structure on bank performance.  
 
Among the other control variables, for example, the effects of capital adequacy ratio, 
non-performing loan, and the board size on bank performance are all significantly 
negative, meaning bank profitability will drop. More specifically, the coefficients on 
CAR are still positively and significantly at 1% in all specifications, while the 
coefficients on NPL are still negatively and significantly at 1%.  
 
Table 11: The relationship between ownership and bank performance (interaction with 
control variables)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variable 
 ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
DIV  0.025 -0.004 0.054 0.122*** 0.025 
  (0.70) (-0.11) (1.61) (4.57) (0.39) 
CONC  -0.418*** 0.034 -0.374*** -0.639*** 0.561 
  (-3.06) (0.11) (-2.78) (-4.68) (1.30) 
STATE  0.001    -0.009 
  (0.11)    (-1.54)    
STATE * DIV 0.003    0.003 
  (1.13)    (1.20) 
STATE * CONC -0.020**    -0.009 
  (-2.01)    (-0.81)    
SOE   -0.013***   -0.014*** 
   (-4.26)   (-3.87)    
SOE * DIV  0.003**   0.004**  
   (2.06)   -2.36 
SOE * CONC  0.008*   0.000 
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   (1.67)   (0.00) 
DPO    0.005  -0.003 
    (1.40)  (-0.62)    
DPO * DIV   0.003*  0.003 
    (1.89)  (1.43) 
SOE * CONC   -0.021  -0.012 
    (-1.13)  (-0.57)    
FOR     -0.024*** -0.003 
     (-2.89) (-0.35)    
FOR * DIV    -0.003 -0.008**  
     (-0.97) (-2.46)    
FOR * CONC    0.088*** 0.039**  
     (4.73) (1.97) 
LNTA  0.003 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.013 
  (0.21) (0.33) (0.42) (0.09) (1.04) 
LTD  0.002* 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
  (1.65) (1.39) (1.35) (1.43) (0.57) 
CAR  0.015*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 
  (3.26) (3.17) (2.99) (2.73) (2.94) 
NPL  -0.126*** -0.134*** -0.117*** -0.133*** -0.131*** 
  (-9.27) (-10.34) (-8.91) (-10.30) (-10.01)    
BLO  -0.023*** -0.001 -0.063*** -0.028*** -0.004 
  (-2.94) (-0.08) (-6.18) (-3.57) (-0.29)    
BS  -0.013** -0.011* -0.012* -0.012* -0.014**  
  (-1.97) (-1.79) (-1.89) (-1.96) (-2.22)    
IND  -0.019 -0.017 -0.011 -0.011 -0.014 
  (-1.57) (-1.47) (-0.91) (-0.94) (-1.21)    
       
Constant  1.261*** 1.281*** 1.231*** 1.276*** 1.191*** 
  -5.66 -5.75 -5.63 -5.72 -4.74 
       
Observation  830 830 830 830 830 
F test  15.685 22.481 19.424 20.937 16.288 
R  0.187 0.248 0.222 0.235 0.297 
       
Note: ROA is ratio of profit to the book value of total assets. ROE is ratio of profit to the book value of total equity. STATE is the 
percentage of equity shares held by government owners. SOE is the percentage of equity shares held by state owned enterprises (SOE) 
owners. DPO is the percentage of equity shares held by domestic private owners. FOR is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
owners. DIV is the diversification for ownership type diversity and calculated from equation 2. CONC is the sum of the squared 
ownership shares held by top ten largest shareholders. TOP3 is the total percentage of equity shares owned by the largest three 
shareholders. LNTA is the natural logarithm for the amount of total assets in thousands of Chinese Yuan. LTD is the ratio of total loans to 
total deposit. CAR is risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. NPL is the ratio of the amount of non-performing loans over the amount of 
total loans. BLO is the number of block shareholders. BS is the number of board members. IND is the total number of independent 
member in the board. 
 
Some prior research has concluded that there are nonlinear relations between 
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ownership concentration and bank performance. To test this on our data, I add squared 
terms for each of the ownership variables (e.g., STATE, SOE, DPO and FOR). 
However, the model specifications are rather weak when the squared terms are 
included and so the results are not tabulated in the study. The evidence for a 
non-linear effect is weak. 
 
 
6 Robustness test   
Next, I replicated my main regressions using alternative bank performance measure to 
examine whether my previous results would be affected by measurement error. These 
regression estimates of the relationship between ownership structures and 
performance that showed in Tables (5) to (7). In the majority estimations of this 
section, I still found that there was a significant relationship between bank 
performance and the different types of owners. 
 
6.1 Alternative bank performance  
Table (12) presents the regression results when return on equity (ROE) is used as the 
dependent variable. The results imply that the significantly positive relationship 
between ownership type diversity and performance remains obvious. 
 
Table 12: The relationship between ownership and alternative bank performance (only 
individual type ownership) - OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE 
STATE  0.025    0.001 
  (1.07)    (0.05) 
SOE   -0.058***   -0.055*** 
   (-5.68)   (-4.79)    
DPO    0.039***  0.01 
    (2.83)  (0.65) 
FOR     -0.025 0.002 
     (-0.76) (0.06) 
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Constant  17.693*** 19.351*** 17.304*** 17.971*** 19.108*** 
  (60.94) (55.56) (55.98) (66.77) (32.06) 
       
Observation  830 830 830 830 830 
F test  1.137 32.314 8.02 0.573 8.166 
R  0.001 0.037 0.009 0.001 0.037 
       
Note: ROA is ratio of profit to the book value of total assets. ROE is ratio of profit to the book value of total equity. STATE is the 
percentage of equity shares held by government owners. SOE is the percentage of equity shares held by state owned enterprises (SOE) 
owners. DPO is the percentage of equity shares held by domestic private owners. FOR is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
owners. DIV is the diversification for ownership type diversity and calculated from equation 2. CONC is the sum of the squared 
ownership shares held by top ten largest shareholders. TOP3 is the total percentage of equity shares owned by the largest three 
shareholders. LNTA is the natural logarithm for the amount of total assets in thousands of Chinese Yuan. LTD is the ratio of total loans to 
total deposit. CAR is risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. NPL is the ratio of the amount of non-performing loans over the amount of 
total loans. BLO is the number of block shareholders. BS is the number of board members. IND is the total number of independent 
member in the board. 
 
Using alternative bank performance ROE in Table (13), I re-estimate the baseline 
model without including control variables, and find that the results are similar to 
benchmark regression in Table (5). The result suggests that the significantly positive 
relationship between ownership type diversity and performance remains in most 
specifications. 
 
Table 13: The relationship between ownership and alternative bank performance (without 
control variables) - OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE 
STATE  0.011    -0.03 
  (0.42)    (-1.02)    
SOE   -0.066***   -0.065*** 
   (-4.98)   (-4.61)    
DPO    0.040***  0.022 
    (2.64)  (1.36) 
FOR     -0.033 -0.017 
     (-0.98) (-0.45)    
DIV  0.757 0.728* 0.888** 0.972** 1.072**  
  (1.60) (1.81) (2.19) (2.29) (2.09) 
CONC  -2.559 -4.070* -0.264 -2.106 -5.791**  
  (-1.42) (-1.87) (-0.14) (-1.18) (-2.44) 
       
Constant  16.868*** 17.275*** 15.638*** 16.597*** 16.245*** 
  (16.85) (18.30) (15.10) (17.25) (15.06) 
       
Observation  830 830 830 830 830 
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F test  3.005 11.288 5.299 3.267 6.299 
R  0.011 0.039 0.019 0.012 0.044 
       
Note: ROA is ratio of profit to the book value of total assets. ROE is ratio of profit to the book value of total equity. STATE is the 
percentage of equity shares held by government owners. SOE is the percentage of equity shares held by state owned enterprises (SOE) 
owners. DPO is the percentage of equity shares held by domestic private owners. FOR is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
owners. DIV is the diversification for ownership type diversity and calculated from equation 2. CONC is the sum of the squared 
ownership shares held by top ten largest shareholders. TOP3 is the total percentage of equity shares owned by the largest three 
shareholders. LNTA is the natural logarithm for the amount of total assets in thousands of Chinese Yuan. LTD is the ratio of total loans to 
total deposit. CAR is risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. NPL is the ratio of the amount of non-performing loans over the amount of 
total loans. BLO is the number of block shareholders. BS is the number of board members. IND is the total number of independent 
member in the board. 
 
After including control variables in Table (14), I still find similar impacts of state, 
SOE, domestic private and foreign ownership on bank performance, as well as the 
measure of ownership type diversity and concentration. Specifically, ownership type 
diversity has a significantly positive effect on bank performance, while ownership 
concentration has a consistently negative effect on bank performance. 
 
Table 14: The relationship between ownership and alternative bank performance (full 
model) - OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variable 
 ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE 
STATE  0.024    -0.026 
  (0.93)    (-0.89)    
SOE   -0.075***   -0.071*** 
   (-5.65)   (-3.79)    
DPO    0.079***  0.014 
    (4.28)  (0.55) 
FOR     -0.057* -0.039 
     (-1.67) (-1.06)    
DIV  0.913** 0.846** 1.351*** 1.322*** 1.267*** 
  (2.04) (2.22) (3.51) (3.28) (2.64) 
CONC  -6.089*** 3.304 -4.922** -5.745*** 3.342 
  (-2.82) (1.25) (-2.31) (-2.69) (1.08) 
LNTA  0.672*** 0.751*** 0.750*** 0.733*** 0.802*** 
  (3.30) (3.75) (3.71) (3.55) (3.93) 
LTD  -0.011 -0.016 -0.016 -0.012 -0.017 
  (-0.53) (-0.73) (-0.75) (-0.57) (-0.81)    
CAR  -0.532*** -0.519*** -0.539*** -0.536*** -0.524*** 
  (-7.05) (-7.00) (-7.23) (-7.11) (-7.06)    
NPL  -1.967*** -1.977*** -1.832*** -1.926*** -1.919*** 
  (-9.11) (-9.37) (-8.55) (-8.96) (-8.93)    
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BLO  -0.199 0.078 -0.598*** -0.213* -0.017 
  (-1.54) (0.57) (-3.79) (-1.65) (-0.08)    
BS  -0.109 -0.111 -0.08 -0.102 -0.103 
  (-1.03) (-1.08) (-0.76) (-0.96) (-0.99)    
IND  -0.500*** -0.522*** -0.479** -0.496*** -0.515*** 
  (-2.62) (-2.78) (-2.53) (-2.60) (-2.74)    
       
Constant  20.217*** 18.136*** 18.395*** 18.796*** 16.950*** 
  (5.74) (5.21) (5.24) (5.20) (4.73) 
       
Observation  830 830 830 830 830 
F test  15.216 18.897 17.287 15.444 14.727 
R  0.157 0.187 0.174 0.159 0.190 
       
Note: ROA is ratio of profit to the book value of total assets. ROE is ratio of profit to the book value of total equity. STATE is the 
percentage of equity shares held by government owners. SOE is the percentage of equity shares held by state owned enterprises (SOE) 
owners. DPO is the percentage of equity shares held by domestic private owners. FOR is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
owners. DIV is the diversification for ownership type diversity and calculated from equation 2. CONC is the sum of the squared 
ownership shares held by top ten largest shareholders. TOP3 is the total percentage of equity shares owned by the largest three 
shareholders. LNTA is the natural logarithm for the amount of total assets in thousands of Chinese Yuan. LTD is the ratio of total loans to 
total deposit. CAR is risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. NPL is the ratio of the amount of non-performing loans over the amount of 
total loans. BLO is the number of block shareholders. BS is the number of board members. IND is the total number of independent 
member in the board. 
 
6.2 Alternative bank concentration   
In Table (15), the ownership concentration is being replaced by cumulative top 3 
(TOP3) shareholding as one of the robustness tests.  
 
Table 15: The relationship between alternative ownership concentration and bank 
performance (without control variables) - OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
STATE  0.001    -0.009*** 
  (0.81)    (-4.24)    
SOE   -0.005***   -0.008*** 
   (-5.20)   (-6.03)    
DPO    0.005***  0.000 
    (5.42)  (0.29) 
FOR     -0.012*** -0.016*** 
     (-5.66) (-6.41)    
DIV  0.069** 0.043* 0.068*** 0.115*** 0.148*** 
  (2.50) (1.75) (2.89) (4.76) (4.91) 
TOP3  -0.478*** 0.005 -0.348*** -0.344*** -0.531*** 
  (-5.73) (0.04) (-4.24) (-4.20) (-3.38) 
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Constant  1.199*** 1.183*** 1.088*** 1.116*** 0.969*** 
  (19.36) (20.65) (18.2) (19.15) (15.08) 
       
Observation  830 830 830 830 830 
F test  15.623 24.893 25.741 26.655 23.052 
R  0.054 0.083 0.085 0.088 0.143 
       
Note: ROA is ratio of profit to the book value of total assets. ROE is ratio of profit to the book value of total equity. STATE is the 
percentage of equity shares held by government owners. SOE is the percentage of equity shares held by state owned enterprises (SOE) 
owners. DPO is the percentage of equity shares held by domestic private owners. FOR is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
owners. DIV is the diversification for ownership type diversity and calculated from equation 2. CONC is the sum of the squared 
ownership shares held by top ten largest shareholders. TOP3 is the total percentage of equity shares owned by the largest three 
shareholders. LNTA is the natural logarithm for the amount of total assets in thousands of Chinese Yuan. LTD is the ratio of total loans to 
total deposit. CAR is risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. NPL is the ratio of the amount of non-performing loans over the amount of 
total loans. BLO is the number of block shareholders. BS is the number of board members. IND is the total number of independent 
member in the board. 
 
In Table (16), after including control variables, I find similar impacts of state, SOE, 
domestic private and foreign ownership on bank performance, as well as ownership 
type diversity and concentration variables.  
 
Table 16: The relationship between alternative ownership concentration and bank 
performance (full model) - OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variable 
 ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
STATE  -0.003*    -0.009*** 
  (-1.84)    (-3.26)    
SOE   -0.005***   -0.010*** 
   (-5.57)   (-4.51)    
DPO    0.006***  -0.004 
    (5.80)  (-1.51)    
FOR     -0.009*** -0.016*** 
     (-4.40) (-5.25)    
DIV  0.065** 0.044* 0.105*** 0.121*** 0.126*** 
  (2.49) (1.84) (4.66) (5.12) (4.44) 
TOP3  -0.563*** -0.036 -0.471*** -0.453*** -0.656**  
  (-6.56) (-0.30) (-5.67) (-5.34) (-2.55) 
LNTA  0.007 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.025**  
  (0.60) (1.06) (1.10) (1.11) (2.08) 
LTD  0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002*   
  (1.34) (1.45) (1.08) (1.44) (1.67) 
CAR  0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
  (3.52) (3.67) (3.41) (3.36) (3.48) 
NPL  -0.132*** -0.130*** -0.120*** -0.126*** -0.123*** 
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  (-10.06) (-10.14) (-9.27) (-9.79) (-9.65)    
BLO  -0.017** -0.007 -0.051*** -0.019*** 0.017 
  (-2.26) (-0.90) (-5.48) (-2.60) -0.99 
BS  -0.017*** -0.015** -0.014** -0.014** -0.011*   
  (-2.63) (-2.45) (-2.25) (-2.21) (-1.77)    
IND  -0.018 -0.019 -0.016 -0.016 -0.017 
  (-1.56) (-1.63) (-1.42) (-1.42) (-1.54)    
       
Constant  1.308*** 1.118*** 1.153*** 1.086*** 0.629*** 
  (6.13) (5.26) (5.46) (5.00) (2.75) 
       
Observation  830 830 830 830 830 
F test  22.003 25.489 25.824 24.026 23.173 
R  0.212 0.238 0.24 0.227 0.27 
       
Note: ROA is ratio of profit to the book value of total assets. ROE is ratio of profit to the book value of total equity. STATE is the 
percentage of equity shares held by government owners. SOE is the percentage of equity shares held by state owned enterprises (SOE) 
owners. DPO is the percentage of equity shares held by domestic private owners. FOR is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
owners. DIV is the diversification for ownership type diversity and calculated from equation 2. CONC is the sum of the squared 
ownership shares held by top ten largest shareholders. TOP3 is the total percentage of equity shares owned by the largest three 
shareholders. LNTA is the natural logarithm for the amount of total assets in thousands of Chinese Yuan. LTD is the ratio of total loans to 
total deposit. CAR is risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. NPL is the ratio of the amount of non-performing loans over the amount of 
total loans. BLO is the number of block shareholders. BS is the number of board members. IND is the total number of independent 
member in the board. 
 
6.3 System GMM estimation    
System GMM estimator is employed as another robustness test. This methodology 
controls for potential endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity and the persistence of 
the dependent variable, measuring bank performance. This methodology also yield 
consistent results. For instance, a higher shareholding from domestic private owners is 
found significant in increasing bank performance in column (3) specification. Besides, 
more diversity of ownership structure is positive with the bank performance in all 
specifications. 
 
Table 17: The relationship between ownership and bank performance (full model) - GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variable 
 ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
Lag.ROA  0.392*** 0.371*** 0.355*** 0.368*** 0.379*** 
  (12.34) (12.28) (10.68) (11.00) (11.94) 
STATE  0.002**    0.001 
  (2.54)    (0.81) 
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SOE   -0.004***   -0.003*** 
   (-6.39)   (-3.12) 
DPO    0.005***  0.002 
    (5.93)  (1.58) 
FOR     -0.005*** -0.003* 
     (-4.55) (-1.93) 
DIV  0.042** 0.058*** 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.064*** 
  (2.17) (3.18) (4.71) (5.18) (3.02) 
CONC  -0.132* -0.427*** -0.08 -0.128 -0.238*   
  (-1.67) (-3.89) (-1.02) (-1.65) (-1.79) 
LNTA  -0.004 -0.004 0.000 0.005 0.000 
  (-0.62) (-0.51) (0.06) (0.79) (0.010) 
LTD  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-0.30) (-1.11) (-1.16) (-0.07) (-0.89)    
CAR  0.034*** 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 
  (9.36) (9.28) (8.55) (9.47) (8.89) 
NPL  -0.102*** -0.101*** -0.103*** -0.103*** -0.100*** 
  (-11.20) (-12.33) (-9.45) (-11.43) (-8.89)    
BLO  -0.028*** -0.013* -0.056*** -0.033*** -0.029*** 
  (-4.34) (-1.91) (-8.53) (-5.31) (-2.72)    
BS  0.015*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 
  (3.72) (3.42) (4.45) (3.90) (4.27) 
IND  -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.036*** -0.034*** 
  (-4.10) (-4.36) (-4.79) (-4.76) (-4.82)    
       
Constant  0.419** 0.337** 0.387** 0.242 0.308*   
  (2.47) (2.21) (2.21) (1.37) (1.87) 
       
Observation  691 691 691 691 691 
F test  138.797 129.139 555.814 125.463 230.406 
AR1  0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
AR2  0.852 0.944 0.872 0.833 0.872 
Hansen  0.150 0.206 0.187 0.158 0.195 
       
Note: ROA is ratio of profit to the book value of total assets. ROE is ratio of profit to the book value of total equity. STATE is the 
percentage of equity shares held by government owners. SOE is the percentage of equity shares held by state owned enterprises (SOE) 
owners. DPO is the percentage of equity shares held by domestic private owners. FOR is the percentage of equity shares held by foreign 
owners. DIV is the diversification for ownership type diversity and calculated from equation 2. CONC is the sum of the squared 
ownership shares held by top ten largest shareholders. TOP3 is the total percentage of equity shares owned by the largest three 
shareholders. LNTA is the natural logarithm for the amount of total assets in thousands of Chinese Yuan. LTD is the ratio of total loans to 
total deposit. CAR is risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. NPL is the ratio of the amount of non-performing loans over the amount of 
total loans. BLO is the number of block shareholders. BS is the number of board members. IND is the total number of independent 
member in the board. 
 
In summary, the empirical results of robustness tests indicate that bank ownership 
structure is not influenced by bank performance and reverse causality does not appear 
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to be a problem for my study. 
 
 
7 Conclusion  
Ownership structure is widely recognized in the finance study as an instrumental 
determinant of firm performance. This study has provided and empirical evidence in 
support of the typical hypothesis that bank ownership governance is an important 
determinant of performance. Specifically, this study examine how ownership type and 
distribution in a country’s banking system affect bank performance. 
 
This study compares all foreign-owned banks, private domestic, and 
government-owned banks to assess the impact of ownership on performance in an 
emerging market. The main findings regarding the static effects of bank ownership on 
performance suggest that banks with more state shareholder tend to have poorer 
long-term performance, consistent with much of the literature. The result can be 
explained by greater government involvement and political corruption in the banking 
system. In addition, banks with higher privately shareholders are generally operated 
more profitably. Furthermore, higher foreign ownership may negatively affect bank 
performance. Moreover, ownership type diversity is associated with better bank 
performance, while banks with concentrated ownership are worse performing. I check 
the robustness of the results by using different model specification and ownership 
indicators.  
 
I believe that my findings contribute to a better understanding of how ownership 
structure influence the efficient operation of Chinese banks. However, many questions 
pertaining to the impact of well-developed governance on the performance of banks 
have yet to be answered. A drawback of the analysis presented in this study is that it 
only examines to what extent ownership structure influence the bank performance or, 
in other words, to what extent governance explain the gap from the accounting ratio. 
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However, it may also be that ownership structure affect bank efficiency, i.e. may lead 
to shifts in the accounting measure. This would be the case if ownership structure has 
an impact upon the efficiency that are most suited for individual banks. In my opinion 
future research on this issue is highly relevant. 
 
I acknowledge that the findings could consistent with other explanations as well. For 
instance, state shareholders may be more exposed to a different set of banks 
regulation such as small banks have more intensive monitoring It is also possible that 
subsidies to poor borrowers may have been funneled through government banks to 
improve social welfare. My findings are of interest to a variety of academics, 
policymakers, and contribute to problems ranging from improving banking 
supervision and regulations to market discipline such as the recent large bank initial 
public offerings (IPOs) from China. The positive impact of ownership diversity 
presence on the bank performance enhances its economic prospects, opening new 
pathways for the flourishing of the banking sector. 
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